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The majority opinion in the instant case cannot be recon-
ciled with any of those authorities. It does not cite or attempt 
to distinguish any of them except the Newson and Sliscovich 
cases which are clearly indistinguishable. 
It is clear that the ruling was prejudicial because the evi-
dence admitted painted defendant as a depraved person-a 
narcotic addict. On that basis alone the jury may well have 
found him guilty. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the reasoning and conclusion 
of Justice Carter. 
[L. A. No. 21983. In Bank. June 26, 1952.] 
MOLLIE SEXTON, Respondent, v. EVELYN SIMON 
BROOKS, Appellant. 
[1] Negligence-Instructions-Duties Toward Invitees.-Instruc-
tion that an invitor is under a duty to keep in a safe condi-
tion all portions of "premises over which he has control," 
whether they are within the building or on the outside and 
used by the general public as well as invitees as "an approach 
to the building·," correctly states the law. 
[2] Streets-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Abutting 
Owner.-General rule is that in absence of statute a land-
owner is under no duty to maintain in a safe condition a 
public street abutting upon his property. 
[3] !d.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Abutting Owner. · 
-An abutting owner is liable for condition of portions of 
public sidewalk which he has altered or constructed for 
benefit of his property and which serve a use independent 
of and apart from the ordinary and accustomed use for which 
sidewalks are designed. 
[2] Liability of abutting owner or occupant for condition of 
sidewalk, notes, 41 A.L.R. 212; 93 A.L.R. 799. See, also, Cal.Jur., 
Municipal Corporations, § 468; Am.Jur., Highways, § 364. 
[3] Liability of abutting owner or occupant for condition of 
part of private driveway which is within street, note, 59 A.L.R. 
441. Liability of owner or occupant for condition of covering 
over opening or vault in sidewalk, note, 62 A.L.R. 1067. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 192; [2-6] Streets, 
§74; [7,8] Streets, §91(3). 
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[ 4] !d.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Abutting Own-
er.-Duty to maintain portions of public sidewalk altered 
or constructed for benefit of property of abutting owner runs 
with the land, and such owner cannot avoid liability on the 
ground that the condition was created by his predecessors in 
title. (Disapproving any suggestion to contrary in Daly v. 
Mathetos, 49 Cal.App.2d 545, 548, 122 P.2d 81.) 
[5] !d.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Abutting Owner. 
-A landowner may be liable under some circumstances for 
the condition of a public sidewalk which has been constructed 
or altered by the city in a particular manner for the special 
benefit of his property. 
[6] !d.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Abutting Owner. 
-If work is done by the city on a public sidewalk without 
rega~d to whether it benefits the adjoining property, and 
if the incidental benefit which results could not have been 
refused by the person who owned the property at that time, 
neither he nor his successor should be held liable for a dan-
gerous condition caused by the construction. 
[7] !d.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Instructions.-In action for 
injuries to woman tripping over concrete ridge in strip be-
tween sidewalk and line of defendant's building, an instruc-
tion that if "there was danger inherent upon a particular 
approach to the building'' it is the jurors' duty to determine 
whether defendant was negligent in failing to warn or pro-
tect business invitees against the danger is erroneous and 
misleading where it is not clear as to who surfaced the strip, 
there is no evidence as to the circumstances under which the 
work was done, and where, under the evidence presented, the 
jury was not compelled to find that the paving, which was 
completed prior to the time defendant purchased the prop-
erty, was done by or at the request of any of her predecessors 
in title. 
[8] Id.- Injuries Caused by Defects- Instructions.-Where it 
could not be said as a matter of law that defendant was under 
a duty to maintain a concrete strip between the sidewalk and 
her building in a safe condition or to warn business invitees 
of the danger inherent in this approach to the building, and 
an instruction that an invitor has a duty to keep in a safe 
condition all portions of the premises over which he has con-
trol was erroneous and misleading in failing to state what 
, constituted "control" or under what circumstances an owner 
has control of an area dedicated to public use, the error was 
not waived by defendant's failure to request an instruction 
correctly defining her duty to plaintiff. 
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Mildred L. Lillie, Judge. Reversed. 
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Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained 
through a fall on a cement walk. Judgment for plaintiff 
reversed. 
Moss, Lyon & Dunn, Gerold C. Dunn and Henry F. Walker 
for Appellant. 
Joseph A. Ball and Thomas F. McGarry for Respondent. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiff recovered a verdict for damages 
for injuries she received as the result of a fall in front of 
a building owned by defendant. The principal question raised 
on this appeal is whether the jury was properly instructed 
on the applicable rules of law. 
Since 1946 defendant has owned a two-story building which 
is located on the northeast corner of Garnet Street and Benita 
Avenue in Redondo Beach. In 1902 the area on the Benita 
A venue side of the property, extending westerly from the 
present building line, was dedicated to public use for street 
purposes. In that same year the city constructed a paved 
sidewalk along Benita A venue in front of defendant's prop-
erty, but left unpaved an 18-inch "strip'' or "shoulder" 
between the building line and the sidewalk. Subsequently, 
at some time prior to 1918, the 18-inch strip was also paved, 
but there is no direct evidence indicating whether the work 
was done by the city or by the property owner. For purposes 
of clarity we shall use the term "sidewalk" to designate the 
paved walk which was built by the city in 1902. 
Defendant's building contains several stores which are 
leased to tenants and face Benita Avenue. Near the north 
end of the building there is a large vestibule which furnishes 
access to the doorways of two of the stores. The sidewalk 
in front of the building slopes dow-nhill gradually from north 
to south without any abrupt change in grade. The strip or 
shoulder conforms to the grade of the sidewalk until it reaches 
a point directly west of the north corner of the vestibule. At 
that point the strip is crossed at right angles by a narrow 
ridge approximately one inch high, and there is a sharp step 
or drop-off in the strip below the ridge which reaches a depth 
of 5% inches at the junction of the strip and the north corner 
of the vestibule. The floor of the vestibule is nearly level 
so that its northern part is approximately 5% inches lower 
than the sidewalk, and the portion of the strip which lies 
directly in front of the vestibule is paved so as to slope gently 

























156 SEXTON v. BROOKS [39 C.2d 
accident plaintiff was walking southward along the shoulder 
intending to enter one of the stores served by the vestibule 
entrance, when she caught her heel on the ridge and fell. 
The jury was told that ''an invitor owes a duty to a busi-
ness invitee to use reasonable care to make all portions of 
premises over which he has control safe whether they be 
within the precincts of the building or on the outside and used 
by the general public in common with invitees as an approach 
to the building. In this case, you are instructed that if you 
believe from the evidence that there was a danger inherent 
upon a particular approach to the building owned by defend-
ant, then you are instructed that it is your duty to determine 
whether or not said owner was negligent in failing to, by 
some means, warn or protect business invitees against the dan-
ger inherent in this particular approach.'' 
The foregoing instruction is based on principles stated in 
,Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, Inc., 28 Cal.2d 394 
[170 P.2d 5], which plaintiff contends are applicable here. 
In that case defendant De La Guerra was the owner of prop-
erty which adjoined a parking lot operated by an oil com-
pany. Mrs. Johnston, a patron of one of De La Guerra's 
tenants, was injured when she stepped down from the· top of 
a retaining wall located on the parking lot onto a private walk 
on the De La Guerra property. There was evidence from 
which a jury could have found that De La Guerra should 
have anticipated that invitees might approach the private 
walk in that manner, and that, under the circumstances there 
existing, the difference in level between the De La Guerra 
walk and the adjoining property created the hazardous con-
dition which was the proximate cause of the accident. We con-
cluded that since De La Guerra had control over the private 
walk it was under a duty to protect or warn business invitees 
against the danger inherent in that approach to the building. 
The present case presents a different factual situation. As 
we have seen, the assertedly dangerous condition, which con-
sisted of the ridge over which plaintiff tripped and the step 
or drop-off below it, was located on the 18-inch strip parallel-
ing defendant's property line, and of itself constituted a haz-
ard which was completely independent of any condition ex-
isting on defendant's property. 
[1] In the first sentence of the quoted instruction the 
jurors were told that an invitor is under a duty to keep in 
a safe condition all portions of "premises over which he has 
control,'' whether they are within the building or on the out-
side and used by the general public as well as invitees as "an 
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approach to the building.'' This is a correct statement of 
the law. The jurors were not instructed, however, what con-
stituted ''control'' or under what circumstances, if any, an 
owner of property has "control" of an area which has been 
dedicated to public use. Instead, the jurors were told in the 
second sentence of the instruction that if ''there was danger 
inherent upon a particular approach to the building," it was 
their duty to determine whether defendant was negligent 
in failing to warn or protect business invitees against the 
danger. As we have seen, the approach to defendant's build-
ing upon which the assertedly dangerous condition existed was 
located on land which had been dedicated to the public. We, of 
course, do not know what interpretation the jurors placed upon 
the instruction given them, but they may have understood it 
to mean that under the evidence they were bound to find that 
defendant had control of the approach to her building and was 
under a duty to use reasonable care to make it safe. 
[2] It is the general rule that in the absence of a statute 
a landowner is under no duty to maintain in a safe condi-
tion a public street abutting upon his property. (Martinovich 
v. Wooley, 128 Cal. 141 [60 P. 760]; Schaefer v. Lenahan, 
63 Cal.App.2d 324 [146 P.2d 929] ; see note 93 A.L.R. 800-
803.) [3] There is, however, an exception to this rule, 
and plaintiff claims that the evidence brings this case within 
that exception. It has been held that an abutting owner is 
liable for the condition of portions of the public sidewalk 
which he has altered or constructed for the benefit of his prop-
erty and which serve a use independent of and apart from 
the ordinary and accustomed use for which sidewalks are 
designed. ( Granucci v. Claasen, 204 Cal. 509 [269 P. 437, 
59 A.L.R. 435] [plank driveway across sidewalk area] ; see, 
generally, notes in 62 A.L.R. 1067-1073; 59 A.L.R. 441-443.) 
[4] The duty to maintain such portions of the street runs 
with the land (Monsch v. Pellissier, 187 Cal. 790, 793 [204 P. 
224]), and a property owner cannot avoid liability on the 
ground that the condition was created by his predecessors in 
title. (Nickelsburg v. City of New York, 263 App.Div. 625 
r34 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2-3] ; Kniffley v. Reid, 287 Ky. 212 [152 S.W. 
2d 615 J ; Herron v. City of Youngstown, 136 Ohio St. 190 [24 
N.E.2d 708, 710]; Joel v. Electric Research Products, Inc., 94 
F.2d 588.) Any suggestion to the contrary in Daly v. Mathews, 
49 Cal.App.2d 545, 548 [122 P.2d 81}, is disapproved. 
[5] A landowner may also be liable under some circum-
stances , where the public sidewalk has been constructed or 
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altered by the city in a particular manner for the special 
benefit of his property. For example, if an inherently danger-
ous condition is created on a public sidewalk abutting an 
entrance to a building, and this is done at the request of 
the owner and for his special benefit in order to serve a use 
independent of and apart from the ordinary and accustomed 
use for which sidewalks are designed, the landowner may be 
under a duty to warn invitees of the hazard. [6] If, how-
ever, the work is done by the city without regard to whether 
it benefits the adjoining property, and if the incidental 
benefit which results could not have been refused by the 
person who owned the property at that time, neither he nor 
his successor should be held liable for a dangerous condi-
tion caused by the construction. (See Werner v. Trmd, (Tex. 
Civ.App.) 2 S.W.2d 525, 526, 527.) 
[7, 8] The jury in the present case was not instructed on 
the rules discussed above, and it was given no directions 
which would enable it to pass upon material questions of 
fact. The evidence was not without conflict, and we cannot 
say as a matter of law that defendant was under a duty to 
maintain the 18-inch strip in a safe condition or to warn 
business invitees of the danger inherent in this approach to 
the building. Although there was evidence, which need not 
be detailed here, that would support a finding that the strip 
was constructed in a manner benefiting defendant's property 
and served a purpose apart from the ordinary use for which 
sidewalks are designed, the facts proved were subject to 
conflicting inferences. Moreover, the record is not clear as 
to who surfaced the strip, and there is no evidence as to 
the circumstances under which the work was done. The 
paving was completed prior to the time defendant purchased 
the property, and, under the evidence presented, the jury 
was not compelled to find that the work was done by, or at 
the request of, any of defendant's predecessors in title. 
The instruction which was given was erroneous and mis-
leading, and defendant did not waive the error by failure 
to request an instruction which correctly defined her duty 
to plaintiff. (See Tabata v. JJ!urane, 24 Cal.2d 221, 227-228 
[148 P.2d 605] .) We are of the opinion that under the cir-
cumstances of this case the error was prejudicial. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, ,J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
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I cannot agree that the instruction quoted in the majority 
opinion is ground for reversal for two reasons: (1) The in-
struction was not erroneous; at the most it was incomplete 
and not sufficiently specific and hence defendant cannot com-
plain because she did not offer a more explicit one. (2) The 
error, if any, in the instruction was cured by other instruc-
ti<:)ns. 
Let us examine the instruction quoted in the majority 
opmwn. The opinion concedes that the first sentence cor-
rectly states the law. The only apparent criticism is that 
the word" control" is not sufficiently defined. That is nothing 
more than a statement that it is incomplete-not sufficiently 
explicit. As defendant offered no more precise instruction 
he cannot now complain. The rule is stated in Tabata v. 
Murane, 24 Cal.2d 221, 228 [148 P.2d 605], cited by the 
majority: ''If the law applicable to the facts of a case is 
stated correctly in a general charge to the jury, a party may 
not, in the absence of a request for a more specific or elabo-
rate instruction, complain that a more specific or elaborate 
instruction should have been given." (Emphasis added.) 
And generally, ''it is unquestionably the law that where a 
general instruction is given which is correct as far as it 
goes, being deficient merely by reason of its generality, the 
injured party may complain upon appeal only in case he 
requests that the charge be made more specific, or asks for 
other qualifying instructions, and his request is denied.'' 
(24 Cal.Jur. 796.) Particularly it has been held that a 
party cannot complain of the failure of an instruction to 
define terms used unless he requests a definition. (Mecham 
v. Crump, 137 Cal.App. 200 [30 P.2d 568]; Neudeck v. Ves-
tal, 117 Cal.App. 266 [3 P.2d 595]; IIamm v. San Joaquin 
etc. Canal Co., 44 Cal.App.2d 47 [Ill P.2d 940]; Los An-
geles City II. S. Dist. v. Schumann, 78 Cal.App. 353 [248 P. 
737]; )l,amos v. Service Bros., 118 Cal.App. 432 [5 P.2d 
623]; Bezera v. Associated Oil Co., 117 Cal.App. 139 [3 P.2d 
622] ; Bruce v. Western Pipe & Steel Co., 177 Cal. 25 [169 
P. 660] ; 24 Cal.Jur. 797.) No complaint may be made, 
therefore, of the first sentence. 
It is clear that the second sentence of the instruction is 
modified by the first sentence thus requiring ''control'' by 
the defendant in the circumstances there mentioned. More-
over, the majority opinion overlooks that part of the second 
sentence reading "if yott believe from the evidence that there 
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was a danger inherent upon a particular approach to the 
building oumed by defendant" certain results follow. Clearly 
the word ''owned'' refers to and modifies approach rather 
than "building." Hence the jury were told that if they 
found that the approach was owned by defendant and it was 
dangerous, there was liability. That is no doubt the law 
because if it is owned by the defendant it is controlled by 
him, and the ownership harmonizes with the first sentence 
which speaks of control of the property involved. 
Even assuming there is some uncertainty in the instruc-
tion it was adequately clarified by other instructions which 
specifically required that defendant be the owner and have 
control of the defective place where plaintiff fell before there 
could be liability. The jury was instructed: "It is the duty 
of a landlord, such as the defendant in this case, to exercise 
reasonable care in making safe, and in the maintenance and 
repair of, any part of a building or other property over 
which he retains control and which is reserved from the ex-
clusive use of any one tenant so that it may be used in com-
mon by all tenants and all others who may lawfully enter 
the premises." (Emphasis added.) "Whenever a person 
is a guest or an invitee of a tenant and as such enters upon 
a part of the premises so reserved for common use, and 
which is under the landlord's control, he is deemed by law 
to be an invitee of the landlord, and the duty of the landlord, 
as I have stated it, applies in such invitee's favor as to those 
parts of the premises under the landlord's control and upon 
or into which said invitee would reasonably be likely to go 
under the circumstances of the invitation, or would be in-
duced or allured to go by the express or implied invitation 
arising from those circumstances. . . . It is the duty of a 
landlord to maintain and keep in a reasonably safe condition 
for use by guests or invitees of tenants any part of a build-
ing over which he retains control and which is reserved from 
the exclusive use of one tenant so that it may be used in 
common by the tenants and all others who may la1vfully 
enter the premises." (Emphasis added.) ". . . [D] efend-
ants were under no duty to keep the public sidewalk in front 
of their premises safe or in repair, or to reconstruct or alter 
it in any way, and they cannot be held liable for a structural 
defect, if any, causing plaintiff's accident." (Emphasis 
added.) The last instruction specifically told the jury that 
there could be no liability if the accident occurred on the 
public sidewalk thus eliminating any possibility that liability 
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could be imposed for Gonditions on property not owned by 
or under defendant's control. 
In view of the foregoing it cannot fairly be said that the 
error, if any, in giving the instruction complained of, was 
prejudicial, and the judgment should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 24, 
1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[L.A. No. 22166. In Bank. June 30, 1952.] 
OLIVER 0. CLARK, Petitioner, v. S'l'ATE BAR OF 
CALIFORNIA, Respondent. 
[1] Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review.-In a discipli-
nary proceeding against an attorney, findings of fact by local 
administrative committee and board of governors are not bind-
ing on the Supreme Court, which can pass on the sufficiency 
and weight of the evidence. 
[2] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review-Burden of Proof.-
Although Supreme Court is not bound by findings of local 
administrative committee and of Board of Governors of State 
Bar in a disciplinary proceeding, a petitioner seeking review 
of the board's recommendation has the burden of showing 
that it is erroneous or unlawful. · 
[3] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Relationship of Parties.-Fact 
that an attorney and an incompetent person occupied the 
relation of guardian and ward, and not that of attorney and 
client, does not preclude disciplinary action against the at-
torney for mishandling the assets of the incompetent per-
son's estate. 
[ 4] Guardian and Ward - Powers and Duties of Guardian. -A 
guardian of an incompetent person occupies a ,position de-
manding of him the highest degree of diligence and good 
faith. (Prob. Code, § 1400.) 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1949 Rev.), Practice of Law,§ 104. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys, § 174; [2] Attorneys, 
§ 175; (3, 6] Attorneys, § 136; [ 4] Guardian and Ward, §55; 
[5] Guardian and Ward, §1; [7,8] Attorneys, §27; [9,10,12,13] 
Attorneys, § 140; [11, 14, 18] Attorneys, § 172(9); [15, 16, 20] At-
torneys, § 139; [17] Guardian and Ward, § 95; [19] Guardian 
and Ward, §93; [21] Attorneys, §137. 
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